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This policy brief aims to support multilateral efforts to 
strengthen biological disarmament by advancing the 
discussion on verification and compliance monitoring.
Conceptually, it offers an analysis of how understandings of 
biological threats have evolved since the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) was first agreed, and it 
introduces the concepts of multi-level stakeholdership, 
network governance and trimodal regulation. It is argued 
that the future of biological disarmament, and of 
compliance with the BWC, lies in outreach to the ever-
growing group of stakeholders and in effective links and 
partnerships between governments, civil society, national 
and international scientific and medical associations, and 
industry.
In thinking through what compliance with the BWC looks 
like in 2013, the policy brief also looks back historically at 
the politics of bioweapons verification. It examines the 
international community’s prime experience of verifying 
biological disarmament, and it draws a number of lessons 
for the inspection process and the tools required.
Absolute certainty on full treaty compliance is exceptionally 
hard to prove in the biological field. Yet, there are a number 
of arrangements that can be strengthened or put in place 
to satisfy states parties that they are not exposing 
themselves to unacceptable risks. These arrangements 
include means to better communicate compliance, convey 
intent, and build stronger responses. 
A set of dedicated forums can be established to 
consider, discuss and give feedback on the national 
compliance reports submitted to the Review 
Conferences and the confidence building measures 
(CBMs) submitted annually.
The “cycles of engagement” these forums establish would 
build a clearer picture of how national compliance reports 
and CBMs operate in practice, and whether they inspire a 
satisfactory level of confidence. Once this emerges, an 
expert working group can be established to develop 
a clearer, collective vision of national compliance 
reports and CBMs, as well as of the longer-term 
evolution of compliance monitoring.
Finally, shortcomings in the United Nations Secretary-
General’s mechanism must be addressed to ensure 
effective investigations in the rare cases when 
breaches in compliance with Article I become 
apparent and there are allegations of biological or 
toxin weapons use. 
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Summary 
Policy brief objective
Verification and compliance monitoring remain highly 
contentious for Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
states, and have been kept firmly off the negotiating table 
for well over a decade. A small group of states is trying to 
change this. In their Working Paper to the 2012 Meeting of 
States Parties, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand 
and Switzerland called for an initial conceptual discussion 
“to promote common understanding of what constitutes 
compliance with the BWC and effective action to enhance 
assurance of compliance.” This policy brief aims to support 
the multilateral policy discussion on strengthening 
biological disarmament.
In thinking through what compliance with the BWC looks 
like in 2013, the policy brief begins by outlining two core 
concepts that are increasingly taking hold in structuring 
responses to biological threats: multi-level stakeholdership 
and network governance. The following five sections look 
back historically to address the politics and practice of 
verification. They analyse how the politics of verification has 
evolved over the forty odd years since the treaty was 
agreed; outline what a biological weapon and biowarfare 
programme is, and what it is that is particular to these 
weapons that makes them so hard to detect; and examine 
the lessons learned about the inspection process and the 
tools required through the international community’s key 
experience of verifying biological disarmament. 
The following four sections deal with compliance 
monitoring today and in the mid-term. It is argued that 
while a fully effective verification system, or certainty on full 
treaty compliance, is exceptionally difficult in the biological 
field, there are a number of arrangements at the multilateral 
level that can be strengthened or put in place to satisfy 
states parties that they are not exposing themselves to 
unacceptable risks. Three core arrangements are outlined 
for communicating compliance, conveying intent and 
building stronger responses. 
The final section of the policy brief looks to the future of 
biological disarmament. A trimodal model or regulation is 
outlined, in which the three different modes of regulation 
must all be harnessed to effectively influence, identify and 
inhibit those who seek to misuse the life sciences. It is 
argued that the future of biological disarmament, and of 
compliance with the BWC, lies in outreach to the ever-
growing group of stakeholders, and in effective links and 
partnerships between governments, civil society, national 
and international scientific and medical associations, and 
industry.
Multi-level stakeholdership 
Concerns with biological weapons were originally related to 
practices and policies associated with national security – 
with military defence against the use of biological weapons 
by nation states and with disarmament efforts. Since the 
early 1990s, however, and particularly post-9/11 and the 
anthrax letter attacks, a new understanding of the 
deliberate infliction of disease has emerged, one which 
incorporates the threat of biological weapons use by non-
state actors and which links biological weapons with 
efforts to ‘secure health’.
This new way of thinking about biological threats has 
brought in a wider range of actors, and now involves not 
only groups associated with war, defence, international 
order and strategy, but also groups concerned with crime, 
internal security, public order and police investigations, as 
well as groups concerned with medicine, healthcare and 
the life sciences.
The move towards multi-level stakeholdership and the 
greater inclusion of what Caitríona McLeish and Daniel 
Feakes call ‘new security’ actors is reflected in the 
changing backgrounds of the contributors to meetings of 
BWC states parties. The narrow group of experts involved 
in the Ad Hoc Group, for instance, has given way to the 
more inclusive approach of the intersessional process. 
State party delegation members now often include 
representatives from the ministries of health, the interior, 
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and the environment, as well as from agencies such as 
health and safety, and law enforcement. ‘Guests of the 
meeting’ have over the last decade included the 
International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
Private industry including professional associations have 
also been given a platform at recent BWC meetings, as 
has the scientific community, including national academies 
of science, as well as a wider range of stakeholders.  
Network governance 
Unlike the top-down approach to law and regulation, 
where those seeking control over an activity authoritatively 
assert their policies on those who are to be controlled, 
multi-level stakeholdership is based on the adoption of a 
governance approach.  
A governance approach begins with the acknowledgement 
that no single body can achieve control on its own. This is 
because, no single actor, public or private, has all of the 
knowledge and information required to solve complex 
dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient 
overview to make the application of needed instruments 
effective; no single actor has sufficient potential to 
dominate unilaterally. Consequently a governance 
approach includes, rather than excludes, the active 
participation of multiple actors. 
The governance framework for biological threats today is 
thus multi-layered and consists of a collection of both 
connected and unconnected measures, as Jez Littlewood 
outlines in his paper to the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission, including: the BWC at the multilateral level; 
the G8 Global Partnership, the Global Health Security 
Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Committee of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1540 at the plurilateral level; national criminal 
law and regulations at the national level; and a host of 
other measures at the subnational level, such as codes of 
conduct, procedures for vetting publications and research 
proposals for security-sensitive information, and private 
sector screening of gene synthesis orders.
In contrast to the traditional, hierarchical model of 
diplomacy that stresses the centrality of intergovernmental 
relations, the multi-level stakeholdership diplomatic 
approach is centred on the network. The former UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, promoted this approach in 
his remarks to the Sixth Review Conference when he said 
that the BWC should be seen “as part of an international 
array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of 
problems” including disarmament, non-proliferation, 
bioterrorism and crime.
Countering the development and use of biological 
weapons is not a matter that can be solved for all time. It is 
a continual process that requires on-going and permanent 
management, and it cannot be achieved by states alone. 
Managing biological threats, including biological weapons, 
requires a broad range of complementary and synergistic 
measures at all levels from the individual to the 
international, and all stakeholders have important 
contributions to make. 
The two concepts of multi-level stakeholdership and 
network governance are increasingly taking hold in 
structuring thought on verification and compliance 
monitoring of the BWC.
King’s College London
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Managing biological threats, including biological weapons, 
requires a broad range of complementary and synergistic 
measures at all levels from the individual to the international, 
and all stakeholders have important contributions to make. 
Verification and the BWC
Unusually for an arms control treaty, the 1972 BWC was 
agreed without on-site verification mechanisms to deter or 
to safeguard against treaty violations. Some states 
maintain that the nature of biological weapons is such that 
they are inherently impossible to verify: not only can 
significant quantities of biological agents be produced in 
small and readily concealable facilities, but most of the 
equipment required (e.g. fermenters, centrifuges, freeze-
dryers) is ubiquitous in public, private and commercial 
laboratories. Others argue that while the same level of 
accuracy and reliability as the verification of, for example, 
nuclear arms control treaties is unattainable, it is possible 
to build a satisfactory level of confidence that biology is 
only used for peaceful purposes. They use the term 
‘verification’ as the description of a set of activities – 
declarations, visits, and investigations – without making a 
value judgment about the level of assurance of compliance 
that could be achieved by this set of activities. 
Clearly, a fully effective verification system for the BWC is 
exceptionally difficult. Yet, there are a number of 
arrangements that can be strengthened or put in place to 
satisfy states parties that they are not exposing themselves 
to unacceptable risks. The following section describes in 
detail what a biological weapon and biowarfare programme 
is, and what it is that is particular to these weapons that 
makes them so hard to detect.
King’s College London
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Judging intent
“This is not like finding a bomb in a 
building some place. The challenge 
in biological inspections is to find 
information that can be easily 
disguised and doesn’t leave much of 
a signature.” 
UNSCOM chief biological inspector 
David Huxsoll
A biological weapon can take many different forms. The 
biological agent of choice can vary tremendously 
depending on the intended effect, be it to kill or 
incapacitate, contaminate terrain for long periods, or 
trigger a major epidemic. The biological agent might be 
completely unknown. DNA synthesis techniques, which 
synthesize DNA strands from off-the-shelf chemicals and 
assemble them into genes and microbial genomes, might 
in future enable the creation of bioengineered agents 
whose characteristics combine traits from a number of 
dangerous pathogens, or whose characteristics are entirely 
novel and possibly more deadly and communicable than 
those that exist in nature. 
Biological agents can be combined with a large variety of 
delivery systems to create a biological weapon; in the past 
these have included: intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
cruise missiles, drones, cluster bombs, pipe-bomb-like 
devices, balloon bombs, ‘feather’ bombs (stuffed with 
feathers inoculated with an agent), sprayers and spray 
tanks, aerosol generators and insects. 
Biowarfare programmes can also come in all shapes and 
sizes, as they have done in the past, from the grandiose, 
resource-rich, high-tech ones to the small, almost primitive 
efforts funded on a shoestring.
The varied manifestations of biological weapons and 
biowarfare programmes can make them especially hard to 
detect. This problem is compounded by the fact that there 
are few aspects of a biowarfare programme that are 
unique to offensive applications and that are readily 
detectable by outsiders. This is unlike strategic nuclear 
weapons, which require large industrial facilities to be 
developed, produced and tested visible to overhead 
reconnaissance systems or with distinct signatures that 
can be detected at long range, and chemical weapons 
programmes, which also require industrial-scale production 
facilities and large stockpiles of munitions to pose a 
significant military threat. Of course biological weapons 
(munitions designed to disseminate biological agents) and 
biological defences (such as syringes filled with vaccine) 
can be readily distinguished when placed side by side, but 
the research, development, production and testing 
activities used to develop these capabilities are similar, if 
not identical, in many ways.
At the research-and-development stage, it is extraordinarily 
difficult to differentiate between research conducted solely 
for defensive purposes and research that is undertaken for 
the development of weapons. The same equipment, 
materials, technologies and techniques are used for both 
types of research. 
Pathogen production facilities can be externally identical to 
medical or pharmaceutical facilities, or indeed to 
nondescript administrative buildings. High levels of 
biocontainment are not necessary to produce biowarfare 
agents, and advanced technology, such as continuous-
flow fermenters and viral reactors, reduce the size of a 
production facility and accelerate the production process, 
obviating the need to stockpile biological weapons. 
Complicating the picture further, the production of 
biowarfare agents does not produce easy-to-detect 
effluents such as those associated with the production of 
chemical and nuclear weapons.
The weaponization of biowarfare agents also does not 
necessarily generate readily identifiable signatures. Field 
tests and associated facilities could be camouflaged as, for 
example, chemical weapon tests, biopesticide trials or 
vulnerability studies. The munitions themselves may be 
modified versions of civilian aerosol generators, chemical 
warheads, conventional bombs or aircraft fuel tanks.
In short, the lines between peaceful research, commercial 
production, and permitted defence activity and illegal 
offensive weapons work are exceptionally blurred in the 
biological weapons field, and this can make it extremely 
difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive or 
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civilian activities. This is why Article I of the BWC – in which 
states agree to never under any circumstances acquire or 
retain biological weapons – is so vague in demarcating the 
borders of prohibited and legitimate activities, and also why 
the Convention places such a heavy burden on interpreting 
the intent of an activity to determine whether or not it is in 
compliance with Article I.
The following three sections outline the key experience the 
international community has of judging intent and verifying 
biological disarmament, and highlight the most pertinent 
lessons learned about the inspection process and the tools 
required.
UNSCOM
United Nation (UN) Security Council Resolution 687 of April 
1991 forced Iraq, defeated in war, to unconditionally agree 
to allow the UN to remove, render harmless, or destroy its 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. It 
established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to 
effect the majority of that mandate, and it directly linked the 
lifting of trade sanctions to Iraq’s compliance with its 
disarmament obligations based on UNSCR 687. 
Iraq’s first declaration to UNSCOM flatly denied possession 
of biological weapons, and Iraqi officials remained 
uncooperative throughout the 35 biological weapons-
related inspections UNSCOM carried out during 
1995-1996. 
UNSCOM was the most intrusive arms control and 
disarmament regime ever devised and it had access to an 
unprecedented range of inspection techniques and 
technologies. It was authorised to conduct an unlimited 
number of unannounced inspections of any site anywhere 
in Iraq, ask any questions during interviews, conduct aerial 
over-flights of any location in the country; seize, copy, or 
photograph any item or record; employ any sensor, take 
any samples, and use any means of analysis it deemed 
necessary; install monitoring equipment at designated 
sites; and search any means of transport. In addition, Iraq 
was obliged by the UN resolutions to provide information 
to UNSCOM on all sites, facilities, materials, equipment, 
documentation, imports, activities, and intentions relevant 
to nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile programmes 
and dual-use capabilities.
By the time of its final report to the Security Council, 
UNSCOM had scrutinized a huge number and diversity of 
facilities and pieces of equipment. It had monitored 82 
dual-use facilities including vaccine and pharmaceutical 
plants, breweries, distilleries, an agricultural research 
facility, a blood bank, a slaughterhouse, a bakery, dairies, 
university labs, and public health and diagnostic 
laboratories; and it had also tagged 1,334 pieces of dual-
use biological equipment, more than in the missile and 
chemical fields combined. And still it was extremely 
difficult to judge intent and verify biological disarmament, 
and UNSCOM could only conclude that it had compelling 
yet circumstantial evidence indicating an offensive 
programme.
Despite this, as Amy Smithson documents in her book 
Germ Gambits, UNSCOM inspectors maintain that 
inspections can sort peaceful biological research and 
production activities from offensive weapons work. 
UNSCOM amply demonstrated the utility of a number of 
technologies and techniques for verifying biological 
disarmament, as well as the extraordinary measures that 
were required to overcome a dedicated state’s attempts to 
conceal and retain an offensive bioweapon capability 
based on multiuse technologies. The first-hand field 
experience and technical expertise of the inspectors offer a 
number of lessons about the core set of inspection tools 
and the inspection process.
King’s College London
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Inspection tools
“The beauty is that we had all of 
these tools and could apply them as 
required. Inspectors should use the 
right tool at the right time. Saying 
that one tool is better than another 
isn’t possible because at some time 
they are all good.”
Senior UNSCOM official
On-site observation:  Active observation and 
comprehension is a skill that needs to be learned. 
Inspectors need to accumulate a mental inventory of a site, 
looking at things systematically, and, when they see 
something odd, discipline themselves to pursue why 
something would be that way instead of letting that 
information go past their eyes. Mixed skill sets or technical 
expertise in inspection teams is important so that some 
inspectors can focus on gathering specialised information 
and others on more general, big-picture information. 
Advance data about dual-use facilities is also important to 
on-site observation, as it helps to anticipate a site’s 
infrastructure, capabilities, equipment, unique features, and 
regulatory framework, as well as the likely number, 
disciplines and skill levels of personnel.
Interviews:  As definitive physical evidence is often hard 
to come by, the biological inspectors relied more heavily on 
interviews than the other UNSCOM inspectors. 
Interviewing is more than just asking a series of questions. 
Like the kind of observation and comprehension required 
for on-site observation, interviewing as part of inspections 
also requires training and experience. Eliciting and 
distinguishing pieces of truth requires knowledge and 
practice in who to speak with, how to phrase a question, 
when to ask particular questions, which details to follow up 
on, when and how to start picking holes in a story, how to 
effectively press for more information, knowing the 
appropriate point to introduce independent data, etc. 
Formal interviews can be useful, and developing protocols 
for how to carry them out is essential. Impromptu 
interviews during no-notice inspections can be equally 
useful. When interviewees are being deliberately deceptive, 
constructive elements can be found in what is or is not 
said. As one of UNSCOM’s core biological inspector said: 
“The lie may be as valuable as the truth because it is the 
bodyguard of what they are trying to protect.” Interviews 
tend not to give you the hard evidence often required, but 
they provide a good indication of possible and probable 
scenarios.
Paper trail and document collection:  For many, 
documentary evidence is more persuasive than information 
that emerges from interviews. In hindsight, many UNSCOM 
inspectors felt they should have pushed harder to acquire 
documents in their very first inspections, not waiting till 
later when arguably there was less to find. Successful 
document audits and document search missions require 
well-trained teams that include technically competent 
interpreters and computer experts. Protocols are also 
essential, detailing how to carry out quick sweeps of filing 
cabinets and drawers room by room, building by building, 
as well as in-depth assessments of paper and computer 
records in the more promising locations (that specify, 
among other things, how to keep appropriate records, 
what to photocopy, and when to confiscate hard drives). 
Devising on-going monitoring procedures specifically 
designed to force evidentiary support of declarations and 
statements is another crucial element in document 
collection. Documentation from sources outside the 
country, such as suppliers, financiers, and shipping 
companies, can also be informative about the size and 
sophistication of national biological activities and the types 
of capabilities that are being pursued.
Sampling:  Physical evidence is often considered the best, 
most persuasive data that inspectors can obtain, and 
sampling gained considerable potency in the 1990s as the 
science of microbial forensics advanced by orders of 
magnitude. As UNSCOM chief inspector Jeff Mohr noted: 
“Now there is absolutely no doubt that inspectors could go 
into a facility and tell what they’ve been doing for the last 
twenty years. With the current, extremely sensitive forensic 
techniques, if anyone used a warfare agent on a piece of 
equipment, it would be almost impossible to completely 
sanitize. A couple of copies of DNA would be found that 
would identify what they made in that equipment.” 
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Standardised protocols for sampling and analysis are key 
to collecting the right sample in the right place, and one of 
the main lessons coming out of the UNSCOM experience 
was that the sooner and more intrusively sampling is done, 
the better.
The inspection process
The UNSCOM experience offered four valuable lessons for 
future inspections to verify biological disarmament. 
First, it highlighted the kind of expertise that is critical to 
inspections of biological sites: practical experience in 
applicable disciplines, an understanding of past biowarfare 
programmes, the ability to think creatively and objectively 
about the potential to employ dual-use equipment and 
settings for legitimate and prohibited military activities, and 
acute powers of observation. 
Second, it highlighted the importance of a more aggressive 
overarching inspection strategy, in which inspection teams 
would be rotated into the country one after another, 
cascading inspections off of the first team sent in. The first 
team would quickly survey the sites of highest inspection 
priority, working from a list of inspection targets probably 
derived from intelligence, open source data, and 
declarations. The initial team would educate its relief team 
on the issues of concern, clues, anomalies, and any other 
information it developed about what was taking place at a 
nation’s dual-use biological facilities. Thus outbound teams 
would recommend the inspection focal points for inbound 
ones, which would in turn develop their own new data. 
King’s College London
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This cascade strategy would still incorporate inspection 
targets from fresh intelligence or open source data, but it 
would largely free successive teams to follow in a timely 
fashion the leads the inspectors found and to spend more 
time at facilities deserving in-depth examination.
Third, UNSCOM experience demonstrated the 
effectiveness of assertive tactics like no-notice inspections 
and the simultaneous deployment of inspection teams to 
different facilities. 
And, fourth, in terms of inspection tools, UNSCOM 
inspectors emphasised the need to sample early, sample 
smart, and sample aggressively. They also emphasised 
that a cascading inspection strategy could be further 
strengthened by purposefully identifying and interviewing all 
of the human assets possibly connected to a bioweapons 
programme as soon as possible.
The politics of verification
Following the initial political debates when the treaty was 
developed, verification came to the political fore again in 
the early 1990s, at the Third Review Conference. 
Continuing concerns about possible Soviet noncompliance 
and growing concerns about a suspected Iraqi 
bioweapons programme, meant a number of state parties 
wanted to press ahead immediately with the development 
of a verification protocol. Others were less interested. As a 
compromise, an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts 
was established, later known as the VEREX group, whose 
mandate was to identify and examine potential verification 
measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. 
The group identified and evaluated twenty-one potential 
verification measures and divided them into several 
categories under on-site and off-site measures. The group 
agreed that no measure, on its own, would be capable of 
verifying compliance, but that some measures applied in 
combination did have the capability to do so. The VEREX 
group concluded – as UNSCOM’s real-world test of many 
of the measures showed a few years later – that from a 
scientific and technical viewpoint, verification of the BWC 
was feasible. 
A Special Conference of BWC members convened in 
September 1994 to consider the VEREX report. Despite 
considerable disagreements on the nature and content of 
any further work, including divergent views on the 
verification issue, the meeting reached a ‘last minute’ 
agreement to establish an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) with a 
mandate to consider appropriate measures, including 
‘‘possible verification measures”, and to draft proposals to 
strengthen the BWC to be included in a legally binding 
instrument. This was part of a ‘package deal’ that also 
included – at the request of several Non-Aligned 
Movement states – the consideration of specific measures 
to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X (on 
peaceful scientific and technological collaboration).
As the AHG negotiations proceeded, the legally binding 
instrument became increasingly referred to as a verification 
protocol. A core group of states recognized the potential 
benefits of a verification protocol and, drawing on the CWC 
verification model, were of the view that its effectiveness 
required the following elements:
• declarations of relevant activities to provide 
transparency on activities of potential relevance to the 
BWC, including biodefense, high-containment biological 
facilities, work with listed agents, and other relevant 
parts of the biotechnology industry; 
• visits to establish routine, non-accusatory inspections at 
declared facilities to encourage complete and accurate 
declarations of relevant facilities, to deter violations in 
declared facilities, and to provide assurance that 
declarations are accurate; 
• facility investigations to enable a short-notice 
investigation at any facility within a state; 
• field investigations to allow a state party to request an 
investigation if it has concerns that biological weapons 
have been used against it; 
• confidentiality provisions to protect sensitive 
information to include appropriate safeguards against 
the possible loss of national security and confidential 
business information; and 
• international cooperation and assistance to facilitate 
international collaboration and the exchange of scientific 
and technical information on biotechnology for peaceful 
purposes, and to provide assistance to a state under 
threat of biological attack. 
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Even at this early stage, however, some negotiators saw 
the word ‘verification’ as a stumbling block to progress. A 
number of states started to use the term ‘compliance 
monitoring’ instead of verification, because of views that 
verification had a specific meaning based on its use in 
nuclear arms control.
In the course of the negotiations, a substantial number of 
states conducted practice visits and/or practice facility 
investigations at sites, including biodefense, high- 
containment, and vaccine production facilities, in an effort 
to evaluate and further develop the provisions that were 
being developed by the AHG. But (unlike the situation 
several years earlier during CWC negotiations) the 
reporting of these experiences did not result in any 
observable degree of a convergence of views, and, in 
particular, did not appear to convince the state parties that 
were opposed to visits to accept them. There were limited 
efforts by states in the formal meeting room to assess the 
utility and efficiency of the provisions being developed for 
the protocol.
By 1999, visits had become one of the most contentious 
aspects of the AHG negotiation. Some states felt there 
should be zero inspection visits a year; others felt that each 
state party was obliged to receive a certain number of 
visits annually. To avoid this issue becoming a treaty 
stopper, a proposal was made to postpone the 
commencement of visits until agreed by a future 
conference of BWC members.
At the end of 1999, some major issues remained 
unresolved. The AHG’s 310-page procedural report (the 
BWC Protocol draft text, usually referred to as the ‘rolling 
text’) reflected a range of divergent positions, with much of 
the text footnoted and/or within square brackets (indeed, 
often multiple sets of square brackets!). The net result was 
that the rolling text contained, in effect, many alternative 
packages between the two contrasting alternatives at each 
end of the spectrum: one set of provisions that were more 
or less as intrusive as those agreed for the CWC, which 
many then considered acceptable for the effective 
verification of the CWC; and another set of provisions, 
significantly less intrusive than those contained in the 
CWC, that many argued would result in a protocol of very 
limited value, if any, to strengthening the BWC. 
In March 2001, the chair of the AHG presented a 
composite text as a compromise to the various preferred 
options in the rolling text.
However, at the commencement of the twenty-fourth 
session of the AHG in July 2001, the United States 
rejected the composite text, arguing that it did not offer 
rigorous enough verification measures to detect 
clandestine biological weapons activities, but that it was 
invasive enough to compromise classified and proprietary 
information from the US biodefense programme and 
pharmaceutical industry. The meeting subsequently 
descended into acrimony, ending without agreement on 
even a procedural report of the AHG’s work. It is well 
documented that several other states who equally had 
concerns with the composite text were happy to hide 
behind the formal rejection by the US. 
The decade that followed saw the introduction of an 
intersessional process in between the quinquennial Review 
Conferences, which shifted political attention away from 
the thorny issue of verification onto less contentious topics 
where dialogue could continue. Recent efforts by a small 
group of states parties to refocus attention on compliance 
in the third intersessional cycle, and to prepare the ground 
for agreement on common understandings and effective 
action at the Eight Review Conference in 2016, is a 
welcome development. It is in everyone’s interest that 
states are assured other nations are abiding by their treaty 
obligations, that evidence of treaty breaches is detected, 
and that, more broadly, the overall threat of biological 
weapons proliferation is reduced. 
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Compliance monitoring
Developments in the political, security and scientific 
contexts over the last decade are making it increasingly 
clear that a fully effective verification system, or absolute 
certainty on full compliance with the BWC, is exceptionally 
difficult. As the United Kingdom noted in its response to 
the 2012 Working Paper on compliance by Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland: “Making 
judgements about BTWC compliance is an unavoidably 
complex task and rarely straightforward; the dual-use 
nature of relevant science and technology makes it much 
more challenging still. And this is becoming even more 
acute given rapid developments in the life sciences and the 
increasing globalisation of biotechnology.” 
Yet, this does not mean that it is impossible for states to 
be assured other nations are abiding by their treaty 
obligations. The United Kingdom response very helpfully 
outlines a series of actions and activities that cumulatively 
may give a reasonable indication of a state party’s intent 
and compliance status over time, including the existence 
and implementation of a broad range of effective national 
measures under Article IV, the effective enforcement of 
legislation, transparency in national biodefence 
programmes, an open publication policy on research at 
biodefence facilities, among many others.
In addition to these national actions and activities, there are 
a number of arrangements at the multilateral level that can 
be strengthened or put in place to satisfy states parties 
that they are not exposing themselves to unacceptable 
risks. These arrangements need to allow states to 
continually demonstrate their compliance with the BWC. In 
other words, they need to allow states to persuade other 
nations that they are engaged in a coherent pattern of 
peaceful activity and that their compliance is full and 
genuine. Three core arrangements are outlined in the 
follow sections: communicating compliance, conveying 
intent and building stronger responses.
Communicating compliance
One of the key means through which compliance is 
actively demonstrated multilaterally is the national 
compliance reports submitted by states parties to the 
quinquennial Review Conferences. States parties choose 
individually how to do this, each selecting the information 
they judge will best demonstrate their 
commitment to the Convention and their 
compliance with its obligations.
The compliance reports have traditionally been 
organised Article by Article, where states 
reiterate their compliance with the various Article 
provisions, describe how their obligations are 
fulfilled, and outline their implementation 
measures. Yet, often the reports take a different 
format. They may be set out using an alternative 
organising principle. Various broad headers are 
often used, such as: “Legislative and 
administrative measures”, “CBMs”, “Working 
with other states parties”, “Biosafety and 
security”, “Response to public-health emergencies”. Other 
states parties use no headers, and some provide only one 
or two paragraphs describing their compliance in broad 
terms. Some provide merely a single sentence stating that 
they are in compliance without providing any further 
details.
Demonstrating compliance, however, involves more than 
just providing information. It involves communication, and 
this entails at least two actors, one providing information 
and one receiving information. In the BWC context, there is 
currently no structure for states parties to collectively 
consider the reports submitted and give feedback on 
them. States providing information do not know whether 
the kind of information they provide is reassuring to others, 
or whether they dismiss it as irrelevant. 
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A fully effective verification 
system, or absolute certainty on 
full compliance with the BWC, is 
exceptionally difficult. 
Yet, this does not mean that it is 
impossible for states to be 
assured other nations are abiding 
by their treaty obligations. 
A dedicated forum is needed in which states parties can 
compare notes on how they are carrying out their 
obligations under the Convention, and consider, discuss 
and give feedback on one another’s reports. The emphasis 
is on offering comment constructively and amicably, not 
adversarially, and on learning from one another’s 
implementation experience with a view to each state 
considering for itself where its own national implementation 
might be strengthened. In the course of such discussion, 
compliance assurance should be enhanced; or, 
alternatively, it may become clearer what additional 
information, not initially provided, would constitute more 
convincing evidence of compliance in the eyes of other 
states parties.
Treaty partners are understandably keen on reciprocity. Yet, 
as Nicholas Sims notes, it is sometimes worth taking an 
initiative even without the certainty that it will be 
reciprocated. A small number of compliance assurance 
initiatives have already been taken. Canada and 
Switzerland, joined in 2012 by the Czech Republic, have 
taken an initiative in compiling evidence of their own 
compliance through an analysis of their regulatory 
frameworks, in accordance with their shared concept of 
compliance assessment. They have put the results into the 
public domain without waiting for other states parties to do 
the same. France and its eventual partner in ‘peer review,’ 
understood as review by counterparts, will likewise be 
taking an initiative without any certainty that others will 
follow suit. These are examples of good practice to be 
emulated; even if emulation is a patchy and slow process, 
these initiatives are worth taking for the sake of the 
Convention’s health. Over the history of the BWC there 
have been others. The forum proposal builds on such 
initiatives and the motives which have inspired them.
It is essential to emphasise that states parties would be 
invited, not instructed, to participate in the new 
forum. Nothing mandatory is being suggested. Nor is it 
assumed that take-up would be near-universal. Instead the 
assumption is that the forum would shape and channel a 
movement beyond the pioneering efforts already noted, a 
movement towards a gradually widening multilateralism.
Conveying intent
The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) of the 
Convention, adopted some years after the BWC was 
agreed in an effort to redress the lack of verification 
mechanisms, provide another opportunity for states parties  
to continually demonstrate their compliance. The regular 
exchange of data they provide for – on, among other 
things, biodefence programmes, laboratories and research 
centres, outbreaks of infectious diseases, and vaccine 
production facilities – strengthens compliance monitoring 
by maximising the transparency of national patterns of 
normal activity. 
In the current political, security and scientific contexts, it is 
particularly important for states to be open about dual-use 
projects that edge close to the offensive and defensive line 
to clearly convey the intent of their activities to the 
international community. For example, as Judith Miller and 
colleagues reported in their book Germs, a series of secret 
projects were underway in early 2000 in the United States 
to improve biodefenses. The Pentagon was buying 
commercially available equipment to build a small-scale 
germ factory to produce anthrax simulants – Bacillus 
thuringiensis, the biopesticide made at the main Iraqi 
bioweapons facility before it was blown up by UNSCOM in 
1997. Another US project involved genetically modifying 
anthrax to make a vaccine-resistant superbug. Meanwhile 
the CIA, in one of its projects, was building Soviet-style 
bio-bomblets and testing them for dissemination 
characteristics and performance in different atmospheric 
conditions. Pentagon and CIA lawyers said the projects 
were legitimate defensive activities: Building and operating 
a bioweapons facility helped uncover the telltale clues of 
distinctive patterns of equipment buying; genetically 
modifying anthrax was essential to check whether the 
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Demonstrating compliance involves more than just providing 
information; it is a two-way communication process.
current vaccines administered to soldiers were effective; 
and building and testing bomblets was a defensive 
response to specific intelligence about a possible 
adversary. Others disagreed, saying the projects were not 
permitted by the BWC. 
The treaty permits almost any kind of research in the name 
of defense. Some of this work is unquestionably justifiable. 
Other research edges closer to the blurred line between 
defensive and offensive work. The trouble with 
distinguishing permitted biodefense projects from non-
permitted projects is that it is not just about the facilities, 
equipment, and activities, but also – as already discussed 
in the ‘judging intent’ section – about the purpose or intent 
of those activities. An essential component in reaching a 
compliance judgment with the treaty is therefore an 
analysis of justifications provided by states for the activities 
in question, and the CBMs offer a useful medium through 
which states can provide these sorts of justifications.
In the interest of maximizing transparency, and 
disseminating the relevant information as widely as 
possible, many states parties are now making their CBM 
returns publicly available or are working toward doing so. 
Making these submissions public can greatly enhance their 
function. The knowledge, experience and expertise of civil 
society can contribute to the CBM communication process  
and to enhancing transparency between states parties in 
several ways, including through: assisting states to collect 
and collate information for and on the CBMs; monitoring 
states parties’ activities; collecting data from open sources; 
processing the data submitted to generate accessible 
information; and, ultimately, by bringing this information 
into the public sphere. Restricting access to CBM returns 
risks building suspicion rather than confidence among 
important stakeholders, and misses an opportunity to 
engage these same stakeholders in processes that might 
actually enhance the quality and completeness of the 
information submitted. 
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Given, however, that most CBM returns will continue to be 
published on the restricted area of the BWC website, the 
CBMs will only enable limited transparency. They cannot 
be utilized by the BWC community as a whole. In an effort 
to remedy this, the current mandate of the ISU should be 
expanded from “compiles and distributes data on CBMs” 
to “compiles, analyses and distributes data on CBMs” to 
allow for an objective trend analysis that highlights 
qualitative and quantitative aspects without making 
reference to individual countries.
Transparency is about something more than just the 
availability of relevant information. It is also about analysing 
that information, and ensuring that any outstanding 
questions are answered. There is currently little knowledge 
of how states parties use the completed returns submitted 
by other states. We do not know to what extent states 
parties feel these measures provide the necessary level of 
transparency or whether they actually build confidence. We 
do not know if the language of submission is a hindrance 
to their use. We do not have periodic, collective reviews of 
the returns and opportunities to seek clarification about the 
information submitted. 
A dedicated forum is needed in which states parties can 
consider, discuss and give feedback on one another’s 
CBM returns on a regular basis. Like the 
forum on national compliance reports, states 
parties should be invited to participate, not 
instructed, and the emphasis should be on 
offering comment constructively and 
amicably, not adversarially. The “cycles of 
engagement” these forums establish would 
build a clearer picture of how national 
compliance reports and CBMs operate in 
practice, and whether they inspire a 
satisfactory level of confidence. Once this 
emerges, an expert working group can be 
established to develop a clearer, collective 
vision of their purpose and longer-term 
evolution.
Building stronger responses
The United Kingdom response to the 2012 Working Paper 
on compliance also outlined a series of actions and 
activities that may raise questions about a state party’s 
comprehensive compliance. These include: clandestine 
procurement of dual-use equipment and materials, closed 
or unduly secretive military or civil biological facilities, 
persistent failure to submit CBMs, hostile attitudes to the 
international community, recurring refusal to respond to 
clarification requests under Article V, among others.
In the rare cases when allegations of biological or toxin 
weapons use have actually been made, they tend to arise 
during international or internal armed conflict, or where 
there has been deep antagonism between the parties 
involved. This calls attention to the importance of impartial, 
multilateral investigations of alleged attacks. The 
involvement of a diverse array of countries in an 
investigation tends to generate greater international 
credibility and legitimacy than evidence based on national 
intelligence alone, and for this reason, provide a stronger 
basis for a response.
In the absence of a BWC verification mechanism, and in 
light of the constraints on WHO’s field investigation 
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An essential component in reaching a compliance judgment 
with the treaty is an analysis of justifications provided by states 
for their dual use research.
The “cycles of engagement” these 
forums establish would build a 
clearer picture of how national 
compliance reports and CBMs 
operate in practice, and whether 
they inspire a satisfactory 
level of confidence.
capability, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General’s 
mechanism is currently the only multilateral vehicle 
available for investigating allegations of biological weapons 
use. The record of UN field investigations under the 
mechanism reveals, however, that past findings have 
largely been inconclusive because of recurrent problems 
with timeliness, access, cooperation by the host country, 
and chain of custody. All of these shortcomings must be 
addressed and corrected if future investigations of alleged 
use are to be effective.
In particular, the historical record has highlighted the need 
for the investigation team to do the following: arrive as 
soon as possible after an alleged attack; obtain 
unrestricted access to the affected area; and conduct 
prompt medical examinations of the sick and deceased. 
Prompt sample collection and analysis is particularly 
important in the case of biological agents, which tend to 
degrade rapidly in the environment and may not be 
detectable after a period of days or weeks. It is also 
essential to document a continuous and secure chain of 
custody for all samples. Past investigations have taught 
that an allegation of use can only be confirmed with high 
confidence if environmental and biomedical samples are 
analyzed by at least two independent reference 
laboratories.
Efforts by the European Union and individual European 
Union countries to review and update this mechanism are 
welcome. Deserving of particular mention is Germany’s 
concern that all previous experience with the Secretary-
General’s mechanism has involved the alleged use of 
chemical or toxin weapons, and that the current 
investigation guidelines and procedures must be made 
suitable for incidents involving microbial pathogens as 
these require different techniques for medical examination 
and the collection and analysis of environmental and 
biomedical samples.
The mechanism can also be strengthened in a number of 
other ways. First, under the present mandate, the 
Secretary-General can only initiate an investigation at the 
request of a UN member state and not in response to 
allegations made by a humanitarian organization, such as 
the ICRC. Giving the Secretary-General greater flexibility to 
launch investigations based on credible information 
provided by non-governmental organizations and other 
unofficial sources would significantly strengthen the 
mechanism.
Second, it should be clarified that the Secretary-General’s 
mandate not only covers the use of a biological agent by a 
state against another state (international armed conflict), 
but that it also covers the use of a biological agent by: 1) a 
rebel army against a state (insurgency warfare); 2) a state 
against a rebel army or against civilians who are supporting 
it (counterinsurgency warfare); 3) a sub-state group against 
another sub-state group (civil or ethnic warfare); and 4) a 
sub-state group against unarmed civilians (terrorism).
Third, a formal means should be established by which the 
Secretary-General’s mechanism can integrate data held by 
WHO, OIE and FAO into an investigation, as these are the 
key collective resources for technical data on unexplained 
outbreaks. Fourth, a strengthened mechanism should 
include a political commitment by all UN member states to 
cooperate fully with field investigations. Fifth, the lack of a 
dedicated source of funding to maintain the lists of experts 
and reference laboratories and to conduct field 
investigations needs to be rectified.
Since allegations of biological or toxin attacks are likely to 
be rare, it would be desirable to hold periodic training 
exercises for the experts on the roster to encourage the 
sharing of knowledge and expertise, to keep the group 
current with any advances in science and technology, and 
to foster the interpersonal relationships needed for a strong 
esprit de corps and effective intra-team communication. In 
addition to the roster of qualified experts, a list of 
“interpreter-experts” skilled in a broad range of languages 
should be established and maintained.
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Truly effective management of the knowledge-based risk posed 
by dual-use life science technologies must therefore couple 
hard-law with both soft-law and mimetic regulation.
The future of biological disarmament
The traditional “artefact-centric” approach to regulating 
unconventional weapons – which seeks to control the 
materials, methods and products involved in misuse – is 
becoming ever-more ill-suited to the life sciences, where 
the technologies are less about hardware, equipment and 
tools, and more about people, processes and 
know-how. Dual-use, or multi-use, life science 
technologies are increasingly diffuse, globalised 
and multidisciplinary and are often based on 
intangible information rather than on specialised 
materials and equipment. This changes the 
definition of the problem from a material- and 
equipment-based threat that can be eliminated 
to a knowledge-based risk that must be 
managed. 
Risk-based regulation involves a plurality of 
public and private actors, instruments and 
purposes that can be grouped into three modes 
of governance: coercive, normative and mimetic:
• Coercive regulation, or “hard-law”, is based 
on the authority of the state and accompanied 
by penalties for noncompliance; it includes statutory 
regulations, reporting requirements, and mandatory 
licensing, certification and registration. 
• Normative regulation, or “soft-law”, is less formal and 
based on conceptions of what is socially desirable; it 
includes professional self-governance, codes of practice, 
guidelines, and transparency measures. 
• Mimetic regulation involves the emulation of successful 
practices and models of behaviour; it includes national 
and international standards, education and awareness-
raising. 
All three modes of regulation play important roles in 
influencing, identifying and inhibiting those who seek to 
misuse the life sciences. Truly effective management of the 
knowledge-based risk posed by dual-use life science 
technologies must therefore couple hard-law with both 
soft-law and mimetic regulation.
Soft-law and mimetic regulation can be shaped by both 
state and non-governmental actors. Efforts to reduce the 
risks of biological weapons proliferation and terrorism can 
only be maximised when these actors cooperate and send 
the same message. The future of biological disarmament, 
and of compliance with the BWC, lies in outreach to the 
ever-growing group of stakeholders and in effective links 
and partnerships between governments, civil society, 
national and international scientific and medical 
associations, and industry.
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The future of biological 
disarmament, and of compliance 
with the BWC, lies in outreach to 
the ever-growing group of 
stakeholders and in effective links 
and partnerships between 
governments, civil society, national 
and international scientific and 
medical associations, 
and industry.
